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REFLECTIONS ON CLASS IN AMERICANLEGAL EDUCATION
RICHARD LEMPERTt
INTRODUCTION

Professor Richard Sander's Class in American Legal Education' is
an almost unique effort to examine empirically the social class origins of
American law school students and to relate law student class origins to
law school stratification, the class structure of American society and the
potential law school applicant pool. His effort, and the special attention
he gives to the class composition of elite law schools comes perhaps at a
fortuitous time in the history of American legal education. The law degree, like the medical degree, has long been a route for upward mobility
in American society. But the access of recent immigrants and others who
were poorly off to the medical degree was substantially limited almost a
century ago following the Flexner Report,2 which largely eliminated
those medical schools willing to admit almost anyone who could pay
tuition. Although elements of the bar and legal education pushed hard to
emulate the "success" of the medical profession by closing down proprietary schools and other perceived weak sisters of professional educa*
tion, their success
was at best limited. 3
There is, however, some question about the continued viability of
this route to higher status for people born into lower social classes.

f
Eric Stein Distinguished University Professor of Law and Sociology, Emeritus, University
of Michigan. Address correspondence to Rlempert@umich.edu or to Richard Lempert, 1510 N.
Colonial Terrace, Arlington, VA 22209. I thank Professor Deborah Malamud for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this article and Professor Richard Sander for his prompt and helpful
replies to questions I asked about his data and methods.
1. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education,88 Denv. U. L. Rev. 631 (2011).
2.
ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: A
REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING (1910).

3. The Carnegie Foundation supplied the law school world with its own version of the Flexner Report, the Reed Report, but its impact was quite different from that of the Carnegie critique of
medical education, which in less than a decade resulted in more than half the nation's medical
schools closing, the consolidation of medical education within universities, and the disappearance of
proprietary medical education. This may have been because Reed, to the disappointment of the law's
professional establishment, saw law as two-tiered rather than unitary profession and supported rather
than called for the termination of part-time legal education. See ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED,
TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPAL
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES WITH SOME ACCOUNT
OF CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA 55-56 (1921). Moreover, the timing of Reed's report

undercut the more Flexner-like recommendations of an American Bar Association Committee
chaired by Elihu Root, a distinguished corporate lawyer, diplomat and Nobel Peace Prize Winner.
See ELIHU ROOT, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO THE SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATORS AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1921). Training for the bar through
apprenticeships did, however, almost entirely disappear during the 20 1hcentury.

683

684

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:4
4

Although life at the bottom of the legal profession has never been easy,
and although forty and fifty years ago many people who sought law degrees as evening or part time students or at proprietary law schools
dropped out before graduating or graduated and either failed the bar or
soon gave up on legal careers, many others experienced at least a modicum of success and enhanced social status, especially as compared to
their parents' generation. This was possible because legal education at
many institutions was low cost, and the world students graduated into
was one in which individual clients and local business owners sought out
individual or very small firm (often partnerships in name only) lawyers.
If not all night, part-time and proprietary law school graduates enjoyed
professional success and if even among those who succeeded success
was often precarious, nevertheless anyone who graduated law school and
passed a bar exam could hang a shingle out and make it or not on his5
ability, effort and initiative.
This world has changed dramatically over the last half century, and
the cost of a legal education at even the least prestigious law schools has
sky rocketed. At the same time opportunities for graduates of low prestige law schools seem to have plummeted, at least in weak economic
times.6 Thus, there is reason to think that if law schools are to remain a
major conduit to middle class status for those of lower class origin, attendance at higher tier law schools, including the most elite schools, will
only grow in importance.
Professor Sander's core finding will surprise no one: as compared to
the nation's population students from lower SES backgrounds are underrepresented in law school student bodies, and this underrepresentation is
greatest at the nation's most elite law schools. It could hardly be otherwise given what we know about how educational opportunities at all
levels vary with socio-economic status and the barriers that costly education imposes. Professor Sander has made an admirable, one might say
almost heroic, effort to go beyond these core propositions, or to at least
to put some accurate numbers on them, as he has searched broadly for
relevant research and data and tried to make creative adjustments in the
available data to allow informative analysis. He is also careful through-

4.
See, e.g., JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OwN: THE SOLO PRACTITIONER IN AN
URBAN SETTING 168 (1994).

5. These graduates were overwhelmingly male. See Judith S. Kaye, Women Chiefs: Shaping
the Third Branch, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 899, 899 (2005) (noting that before and during the 1960s,
women's presence in law schools was miniscule).
6. David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, January 9, 2011, at BUI,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html?src=me&ref-general. Those
who graduate near the bottom of higher prestige law schools are also reporting difficulties in finding
law jobs, though there have been reports that some law schools are serving as employers of last
resort for hard to place students until the time for reporting law graduate employment rates to U.S.
News has passed.
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out his article to acknowledge weaknesses in his data and the places
where assumptions must bridge empirical gaps.
Professor Sander's core findings are undoubtedly correct. That his
work does not succeed in advancing our knowledge greatly or in providing important new information to guide policy analysis, which is my
assessment of his effort, is hardly his fault. As Professor Sander recognizes, the problem he is attacking is a difficult one, the data are unfortunately both sparse and imperfect, and there are often no obviously or
indisputably correct ways to treat the data. With respect to the policy
implications of his findings, and in particular whether law schools should
engage in affirmative action for students from lower class backgrounds,
there are additional issues. I will address these issues, which for me are
the most interesting aspect of the project, after first discussing a number
of conceptual and methodological matters that make the task of shedding
empirical light on class in American legal education so difficult and limit
the confidence we can have in the specifics of Professor Sander's analysis and thus limit what we can learn from it. By and large the problems I
shall illuminate do not result from errors by Professor Sander; they are
the nature of the beast. With currently available data any analysis would
be bedeviled by them.
I. CONCEPTS AND GOALS
The most fundamental questions raised by the task Professor Sander
has set himself are conceptual rather than statistical because conceptual
clarity is needed to determine what data and statistics relate to which
matters of concern. For me the starting point in thinking about the concept class is to ask why we might want to make special efforts to increase diversity within law schools by increasing enrollments of students
with underrepresented characteristics or backgrounds, including, in particular, class, ethnicity or race. I see two sets of reasons that speak to
different educationally-related and social values. One I would call the
"individually-oriented fairness set." Students from lower SES backgrounds and minorities are more likely than advantaged whites to have
been handicapped in their pursuit of higher education. Often their K-12
educations have been inferior to those of better off whites, and the cost of
higher education is a greater barrier for them than for students whose
parents are better off. In addition, cultural disadvantages may have led to
lower grades or otherwise adversely affected the credentials lower class
whites and minorities can offer a law school admissions officer.7 If applicants disadvantaged by class or race seem to be not quite as attractive
as other applicants, the appearance may be misleading. Their "objectively" measured accomplishments may reflect as much lawyerly poten7.
See PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, REPRODUCTION: IN EDUCATION,
SOCIETY AND CULTURE 160, 209 (Richard Nice trans., 1977).
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tial or innate ability as that suggested by the more impressive dossiers of
advantaged white students as well as a history of harder work and greater
achievement. Also included in the fairness set is the historic role of legal
education as an enabler of social mobility. Applicants from lower class
backgrounds and from certain racial and ethnic groups have not been
dealt a fair hand in life when it comes to their ability to succeed in educational and material ways. Increasing class and race diversity within law
schools by targeted outreach and recruitment and by preferring applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds to somewhat better credentialed
applicants from more advantaged backgrounds can mean evaluating
comparative credentials more fairly and compensating for the unfair distribution of initial advantage.
The other set of values that may lead us to desire broader inclusion I
see as "social" or "other-directed" in nature. Chief among these is the
idea that greater diversity among a school's matriculants increases the
richness of every student's education. This view holds that the more diverse a student body is, the more diverse the experience and points of
view exchanged in classroom discussion and informal conversation, and
the greater and more diverse the opportunities for law-related extracurricular involvements. 9 Law school diversity is also thought to serve society because it leads to a more diverse legal profession. Lawyers tend to
serve distinct groups, often in specialized ways, and lawyers can serve as
community leaders and role models even when they are not acting as
attorneys. Lawyers from underrepresented groups are likely to contribute
differently in these ways than lawyers from the white majority.10
Although these benefits of diversity reflect values that many people
share, they are not all equally legitimate as justifications for affirmative
action programs. Although there appears to be no legal impediment to a
school in good faith taking account of one applicant's educational disadvantages when comparing his or her credentials to those of another applicant with an eye to judging lawyerly potential, a willingness to work

In addition, a student's identity may affect how his or contribution to a discussion is
8.
received. The same anti-war statement will be received differently if it comes from an Iraqi war
veteran rather than an anti-war activist, and the impact of a statement questioning or supporting racebased affirmative action will similarly differ depending on whether the speaker is black or white.
9. These conclusions have not to my knowledge been the subject of rigorous empirical
examination, although anecdotal evidence, such as the plethora of journals reflecting gender or
ethnic themes and reports by professors of how their classrooms have been affected by diversity, can
be easily found.
10. A study of the University of Michigan Law School alumni found that lawyers tended
disproportionately to serve clients of their own ethnic group and that Michigan graduates did substantial pro bono work and often occupied leadership positions in communal or political settings,
with minority law school graduates being more involved in pro bono and leadership activities than
whites. Richard 0. Lempert, David L. Chambers & Terry K. Adams, Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 395, 436-37, 440,
453-58 (2000).
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hard or a person's native ability, the Bakke case" suggests that for state
schools that did not in the recent past invidiously discriminate going beyond this and seeking to promote racial balance to correct past injustice
or to promote minority social mobility is unconstitutional.12 Bakke would
appear to similarly rule out justifications for affirmative action based on
such concerns as better serving members of minority communities, providing role models for minority youth, or filling leadership or other positions that would benefit from a minority occupant." What is currently
constitutional, and in this sense the favored justification for affirmative
action, are preferences based on the contributions a diverse student body
brings to every student's education.
These limitations apply to raced-based affirmative action. Social
class is not, however, a suspect classification, and there is no reason to
think that a class-based system of affirmative action, which gave preferences to applicants based on class-related disadvantages, would run afoul
of the Constitution. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to think, as some
do, that correcting for accidents of birth and providing socially disadvantaged groups with a head start to upward social mobility, is a morally
superior grounding for affirmative action than the justifications the Court
admits. Still it is important to bear in mind, and I shall come back to this
later, that the judicially favored justification for existing affirmative action programs lies in the presumed educational value of racial and ethnic
diversity, with perhaps some recognition after Grutter, that the social
benefits of a more diverse legal profession are also in some measure constitutionally cognizable.
II. OPERATIONALIZING SOCIAL CLASS: LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA

This digression into justifications for the law of affirmative action
relates to how Professor Sander has conceptualized social class, or been
forced to conceptualize it, given the data available to him. Thus to understand what we can learn from his article, it is important to appreciate the
decisions he made regarding the measurement of social class and the
limitations of what he was able to do. To a large extent this simply involves fleshing out the concerns that underlie the caveats Professor
11.
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 301-02 (1978) (stating that
preferential classifications have never been approved absent a determination of past discrimination).
12.
Although the Court has not directly addressed the issue, it is likely that the Civil Rights
Act will be read to prevent private schools from engaging in affirmative action programs that would
be unconstitutional if done by state schools.
13.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), in reaffirming Bakke, might be read as opening
the door to the last of these justifications since Justice O'Connor, who wrote the opinion, specifically
mentioned the special value that minority lawyers have for the military and business. However, as
Professor Sander notes, the continued constitutionality of educational affirmative action is itself
precarious. This is an issue on which the pre-existing views of the Justices seem more influential
than any legal or empirical arguments lawyers might bring to bear. Four of the current Justices
would most likely welcome the opportunity to ban affirmative action while a fifth, Justice Kennedy,
has a position whose nuances are hard to discern.
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Sander appropriately provides. The need for such exegesis does not mean
there is anything inherently right or wrong about how Professor Sander
chose to operationally measure social class. It is simply to recognize the
noisiness of the data, the way it fuzzes numerical relations and the need
for caution in drawing firm empirical or policy conclusions.
To begin with a conceptual matter, it is important to recognize that
Professor Sander's measure of social class, an index of the socioeconomic status (SES) of law school students relative to the general
population, relates directly to only the first, or individualistic, set ofjustifications for affirmative action given above. Individuals who, by Professor Sander's SES measure, are in the lower social classes have roots that
are likely to have disadvantaged them relative to applicants of higher
social origins. They may also differ from their more advantaged counterparts in that for them professional education is a way to achieve social
mobility, a goal that may not greatly concern those who have already
arrived.14 But, as I shall argue below, students who add diversity only
because of their low-SES backgrounds are not necessarily likely either to
enrich substantially the educational environment of the schools they attend or, after law school, to serve as social and political leaders, role
models or exceptional givers back.
Turning to more technical issues, although Professor Sander's index
may be the best he can do given the available data, it not only has shortcomings as a measure of relevant social class characteristics but it would
also be less than ideal if its sole purpose were to measure socio-economic
status as the term is used in the social sciences. Social class, as Professor
Sander recognizes, is a complex concept not easily captured even when a
researcher has richer information than the AJD data set provides. In classical Marxism, it involves an individual's relationship to a society's
means of production, which is associated over the long run with a common set of interests and a common world-view. This is why occupation
figures prominently among the measures used to capture social class.
However, social class reaches beyond occupation to encompass other
matters that relate to social status, including, in particular, education,
income and wealth. More broadly conceived, and in common parlance,
social class is confounded with social status. Class membership, including the assignment of people to classes, is associated with such variables
as family heritage, religion, power and influence, friendship circles, cognitive style and a range of cultural preferences. Despite Marx's views
and research practice in defining SES, this last set of variables may relate
more closely to how people see their social class and the class placement
of others and to the attitudes they hold than occupation, income or educa14. Except for the bluest of bloods everyone may, of course, rise in social status, but for those
who come from well-educated, well-off families a professional education does not without much
more mean a rise in social status.
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tion. Although variables like religion, friendship circles and cultural
preferences are correlated with the variables used to measure SES, they
are likely to relate more closely to the attitudes and ambitions students
bring to law school and life than SES as Sanders measures it.
Thinking of class in the larger sense and, in particular, as an inherited status which similarly affects attitudes from generation to generation, one problem with using parents' SES to measure student social
class is that the nation has experienced substantial recent immigration,
and those who came as young immigrants or as the children of immigrants are now applying to and graduating from law school. Even if levels of SES, as commonly measured by occupational status, education and
income, are consistently associated with differences in aspirations, values
and attitudes among American families that go back at least two or three
generations as well as with different chances of social mobility, similar
relationships may not hold for recent immigrants and their children.' 5
Indeed, immigrants who had to flee their homelands because they were
on the wrong side of social conflicts may, even if they had less than high
school educations, have been part of local or national aristocracies in
their home countries. A school that sought to give a boost to the children
of lower class origins might find, as UCLA did in an effort Professor
Sander discusses, that they were largely advantaging immigrants' children who differed substantially from white, black and Hispanic Americans with respect to most class-linked variables even though they all
seemed of the same class when viewed through the lens of SES. Being
unable to account separately for the children of immigrants might lead to
inflated estimates of the proportion of law students of lower class background while underestimating the law school acceptance rates of lower
class applicants as a proportion of their presence in the applicant pool.' 6
Putting aside the limitations of SES as a measure of class and accepting the convention which leads most demographers to treat SES as
our best indicator, it is still the case that data limitations mean that Professor Sander's SES measure is a noisy one and less than ideal. To begin
with, it lacks data on income, one of the three measures integral to the
15.
SES scores may also mislead when they place rural and urban families in the same social
class.
16. For example, assume a school had 200 applicants, 40 of whom came from families whose
SES scores placed them in the bottom quarter of all American families and that of these 40, ten came
from families that were intergenerationally lower class while 30 were immigrants' children whose
families, despite occupying low status and low paying jobs in the United States, had backgrounds of
privilege quite distinct from the backgrounds of families we think of as lower class. If the school
admitted 100 students, 10 of whom were immigrants children and 6 of whom were intergenerationally lower class, it would appear from the SES measure that 16% of the entering class came from
lower class origins when, I would argue, only 6% did. At the same time, relative to their representation in the applicant pool, it would appear that only 37.5% of applicants with lower class origins
were admitted compared to 52.5% of students from more advantaged backgrounds. However, 60%
of the intergenerationally lower class gained acceptance under this hypothetical scenario. I am not
saying these kinds of effects will occur, but the data are such that we cannot exclude this possibility.
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conventional SES scale.17 Working with what he has, Professor Sander
uses four responses to operationalize SES: each respondent's report of
each parent's education and occupation. Information on all four measures
was, however, available for only about 28% of the AJD national sample
or about 38% of those for whom there was usable data.
Professor
Sander thus felt compelled to calculate an SES measure so long as information on at least two of the four measures was available.' 8
The cases with absent information have various configurations of
useable data. In more than a third of them only occupation or only education defines the SES index. Perhaps most striking is that there are only
nine instances, one involving a father and eight involving mothers, in
which all we know is one parent's occupation and education.19 This suggests the possibility that missing data may create relevant sample biases
since if respondents were raised in single parent families, one might expect them to know that parent's education and occupation far more frequently than they would know the absent parent's accomplishments, and
single parent families are known to be, on average, of lower SES than
families where both parents are present. It could be that my fear of reporting bias is groundless or that almost no one in the AJD sample was
raised in a single parent household, but it seems more likely that missing
information means Professor Sander's sample excludes a disproportionate number of AJD respondents in the lowest SES brackets. Particularly
likely to fall in this category are the 143 respondents who reported only
their mother's occupation. Because an SES variable cannot be constructed for these cases, Professor Sander's analysis is likely to underestimate the proportion of law students in the lower reaches of the national
17. Also missing is information on family wealth, which is not included in most studies that
use SES as a variable not because it is conceptually unimportant but because reliable wealth data is
hard to come by. Indeed, conceptually wealth may be the most important indicator of a family's
social class. In its absence, occupation is generally taken to be the best single measure of social class
among the SES index variables because occupational prestige is thought to do most to locate a
person's position in the social hierarchy. I discuss why the absence of income and wealth data is
especially unfortunate given all that Professor Sander seeks to accomplish in the text of note 23
infra.
18.
Professor Sander reports that about a quarter of his sample cases lacked information on
either three or all four of the indicators and so were excluded from his analysis. See Class, supra
note 1, at 634. Note also that the parental SES data are frozen at a point in time, but people's occupation and educational achievements change over time. To the extent these SES variables reflect class
differences by more than definition, a law student's class roots may be different than a current status
report may make them appear. A person working as a retail clerk may have been running a successful business until an economic down turn when his child was a junior in college, or a mother who
worked as a teacher's aide most of her adult life may recently have completed a bachelor's degree
and been hired as a regular teacher.
19.
Other categories that are almost empty in the usable sample of almost 3000 are cases
where we know both parents' occupations and one parent's education (8) and cases where we know
one parent's occupation and the other parent's education (5). Particularly puzzling is that although
there were 375 respondents who chose to report only their father's and mother's education or about
half the number who reported only their two parents' occupations, there was no respondent who
reported just one parent's education although there were 534 respondents who reported just one
parents' occupation. Something seems wrong here.
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SES distribution. Race-specific analyses will also be affected if poorlyoff single parent families are disproportionately members of minority
groups, as we have some reason to believe. 2 0
In addition to sample biases that may stem from the disproportionate exclusion of respondents from single parent families and other biases
that may infect an index that is based on more information for some
cases than for others, there is the possibility of general non-response bias
since many in the study sample chose not to participate, and among participants more than 900 did not provide sufficient information to construct an SES index.21 It is easy to suppose that students whose parents
had low prestige occupations or were least accomplished educationally
were most reluctant to report, and this tendency could have been greatest
among those attending more elite law schools who may have measured
their parental heritage against the high status backgrounds of most of
their peers. If so the proportion of low SES law students in all law
schools and in elite law schools in particular will have been underestimated in the data Professor Sander presents. I cannot evaluate this possibility. Although I do not think it so serious as to undermine Professor
Sander's core results, I expect that sample biases introduce statistical
noise into an already conceptually noisy measure.22
It is unfortunate that Professor Sander was unable to include in his
SES index measures of family wealth and income.23 As he recognizes,
the exclusion of financial information poses particular problems for the
location of black respondents on the SES scale and hence for evaluating
their contribution to class diversity within American law schools.24 AJD
data indicate that with respect to wealth and/or income black law graduates are worse off than whites. Only 6% of black AJD respondents
graduated from law school with no educational debt. This compares to

20.
I am grateful to Professor Sander for providing me with the detailed breakdowns regarding variable availability that I report in this paragraph. I should add that he recognizes in his paper
the possible overstatement of black SES that could result from the absence of usable data from
students raised in single parent households. Class, supra note 1, at 652.
21.
Responses were received from about 51% of those in the nationally representative sample
and from about 43% of those in the minority oversample, where one might expect lower SES attorneys to be disproportionately represented.
22.
See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text for further discussion of sample bias.
23.
Professor Sander recognizes this and notes that in the Census PUMS data an index reproducing his measure of SES correlates somewhere between .4 and .45 with household income. Class,
supra note 1, at 638 n.25. Although this correlation is, no doubt, highly significant in the statistical
sense, it does not denote a particularly close relationship or one which justifies dismissing concerns
regarding the implications of the absence of income information for the validity of operationalized
SES. A correlation between the study's SES index and household income of between .4 and .45
means that the SES index explains only sixteen to twenty percent of the variance in household incomes in Professor Sander's PUMS subsample. Moreover, this may be an overestimate of the correlation in the AJD data because the PUMS on spousal occupation and education is likely to have been
more complete than it is in the AJD sample.
24. See Class, supra note 1, at 652.
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19% of white graduates. 25 Moreover, black respondents' families were,
on average, able to contribute only about 9% of the cost of their children's legal education, compared to an average contribution of 19% by
the families of white respondents. 26 Hispanics were more like blacks on
these dimensions and Asians more like whites, with the most notable
statistic being that Asian families contributed, on average, 28% of the
cost of their children's legal educations.27 The data also indicate that
although law students may be relatively better off than Americans in
general, it is a mistake to think of law schools as domains of upper class
privilege. Eighty-four percent of all law students graduated with some
debt, and the median debt among those who owed money was about

$70,000.28
Professor Sander makes an extraordinary effort to map his two SES
indicators for law school graduates onto the SES distribution of the general population, but error inescapably affects this effort as well. As
Sander notes, the AJD education data cannot be directly mapped onto the
Census data because the two efforts classify educational achievement in
different ways, and to map one onto the other he must rely on assumptions that, no matter how plausible, are necessarily imperfect. Moreover,
even if the Census and AJD coded educational achievement identically,
difficulties in accurately situating AJD respondents against all Americans
would still exist if education is of interest only as a presumed indicator of
social class. The problem is that similarly coded educational achievements may have wildly different class implications. From a social class
standpoint, there is most likely a wide gap between a person whose parents have Harvard or Yale degrees and one whose parents are Liberty
University or Berea College graduates. Even high school degrees can
represent different achievements and career opportunities. One high
school graduate may have had a rigorous education that prepared her
well for the world of work, while another's degree may represent a series
of social promotions. Moreover GED certificates are counted as high
school diplomas. Imperfect measures are a fact of social science life. In
the context of Professor Sander's study, they are likely to fuzz distinctions between his quartiles.
The mapping of AJD parent occupations onto census categories is
less problematic than the education mapping since Professor Sander reports that the AJD occupational data were coded by census categories
allowing a direct comparison. Issues exist, however, not with respect to
the mapping but with their implications for social class. Professor Sander
25.

FIRST

GITA Z. WILDER, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION: FINDINGS FROM THE

WAVE

OF

THE

AFTER

THE

JD

STUDY

58

tbl.36

(2008),

available

http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/raceand-ethnicitymonograph.pdf.
26. Id. at 59 tbl.37.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 58, 60 tbls.36 & 38.

at
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assigned scores intended as relative class rankings to occupation using
CAMSIS codes based on year 2000 U.S. Census data. This is not an unreasonable choice, but CAMSIS coding has its problems. 2 9 For example,
for both men and women farming, fishing and forestry occupations are
well within the bottom 10% of all occupations and below the status ascribed to counter attendants and cafeteria workers. Yet one might expect
that the world views of these groups would be quite different and that
within the group of farm, fishery and timber workers there would be considerable differences depending on their relationship to the land and to
their employers (e.g. working on a family farm or as a migrant laborer).
Moreover, the code for farm, fishery and timber workers is more than
100 places below that for hunters and trappers whom we might expect to
be of lower class origin than some in the farm and fishing occupation
categories.
More than 150 occupations above farm workers, one finds the score
for farmers and ranchers and somewhat above them the score for male
but not for female ranch and farm managers. Totally apart from whether
these relative rakings make sense, the AJD questionnaire included only
tiny spaces in which respondents could write their parents' occupation.
Consider the challenge and room for error when a father's occupation is
reported as "farming." If coding is direct to CAMSIS codes, the father
could be placed in the bottom 10% of occupational SES or at about the
6 0 ' percentile depending on whether the coder assumed the father was a
farm worker or a farm manager. Coding first to census categories and
then to CAMSIS codes does not solve the problem because similar assumptions must be made in deciding which census code best fits.
For men the top occupation on the 569 occupation list and the second highest for women is psychologist, which outranks physicians and
surgeons and astronomers and physicists, and is nearly 100 positions
higher than financial managers. Economist and lawyer are both in the top
few percentiles, although the prestige of lawyers in different subspecialties varies widely. 30 It may raise few eyebrows to find that economist
ranks higher than lawyer, but it is surprising to find both about seventy
places above mathematicians and statisticians. At the top end of the scale
as at the low end puzzling ambiguities and inconsistencies are also present. Among men those best described as "miscellaneous social scientists, including sociologists" are among the top ten in occupational status,
but if the code chosen is "sociologist" by itself the rank is 23 places
lower. Among women, however, "sociologist" is the more prestigious
category. It ranks 28 places higher than "miscellaneous social scientists
including sociologists."
29.

See discussion infra note 31.

See generallyJOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982) (analyzing the social differentiation among different types of lawyers).
30.
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Further ambiguity and error is introduced when AJD occupational
codes are converted to population percentile rankings by reference to the
CAMSIS scores of a randomly selected subsample of the 5% PUMS
sample. Simply put the assumption that higher CAMSIS scores reflect
higher social status does not seem always to hold. For example, I find it
difficult to believe that female audiologists who would be in the 99th percentile after Sander's CAMSIS score conversion are of higher status than
female physicists (9 7 h percentile), nuclear engineers (9 5 h percentile),
CEOs ( 9 3 rd percentile), or aircraft pilots ( 8 3rd percentile).

I don't rehearse these difficulties to criticize Professor Sander for
using CAMSIS codes in his analysis, for any coding system has its
weaknesses, and CAMSIS codes were created to better capture class
distinctions.3 1 Rather I mention them because they add another dimension of uncertainty to the results Professor Sander provides.
An additional reason to be weary of the specifics of Professor
Sander's analysis is selection bias. The AJD sample is limited to those
who not only graduated from law school but also passed the bar exam.
This means that law school drop outs and those who graduate but do not
pass the bar exam are not included in the analysis although they figure in
There are other problematic aspects but a detailed discussion would take us far afield and
31.
soon, I expect, pass the limits of my knowledge. Simply put CAMSIS coding is a novel way of
assigning status values to occupations based on interaction patterns of people who, more often than
not, have different occupations. Theoretically these patterns should be based on occupation pairs
involving friends, neighbors and relatives, but often data constraints mean that the only pairs that can
be created are those of husbands and wives. Code creation becomes problematic when data sources
include many couples where only one spouse is working or where there exist what are called
"pseudo diagonals" (strong but misleading husband-wife associations as when a husband may be
categorized as an agricultural proprietor and a wife as an agricultural laborer.) CAMSIS codes,
which were originally established for occupations in the U.K., can and have been established for
different countries as in the U.S. Census data based rankings that Professor Sander employs, but they
can also be created for particular data sets. Moreover, they are claimed by their creators to represent
occupational status directly and not be limited to specifying the relative status of different occupations. An additional complication exists in combining husband and wife occupations into a common
index, since they are not on the same scale. Thus those who adapted the scale to the 2000 census
data which Professor Sander uses caution:
[It is a little misleading, albeit a commonly made mistake, to analyse [sic] a mixed gender population through CAMSIS scores which are the male scale scores for the men and
the female scale scores for the women. The occupational scale indexing used for men and
women is invariably the same, further giving the impression of equivalent meanings.
However the CAMSIS methodology assumes different systems of relative positions prevail within the male and female occupational structures, and hence implicitly that equivalent titles are not necessarily the same between genders.
Accessing and Using CAMSIS Scale Scores, CAMSIS: SOCIAL INTERACTION AND STRATIFICATION

SCALE, http://www.camsis.stir.ac.uk/useofscores.html (last visited May 6, 2011) (emphasis in red in
original). Professor Sander converted CAMSIS codes by gender to percentiles as normalized against
the 5% PUMS subsample, perhaps to deal with this issue, but using standard scores or the husband's
score is the recommended procedure. I am unclear how Professor Sander assigned his percentile
scores or what the implications of his assignment across genders are. He reports in a methodological
appendix that for women he assigned a 99"h percentile rankings to codes of 75 and above, yet in the
CAMIS ranking data he kindly provided me, a CMASIS score of 75 for women seems to be at the
941h percentile. For a useful summary of how CAMSIS scores are assigned and cautions in using
them, see id.
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the proportion of students from different social classes who are admitted
to law schools and affect a law school's class composition so long as
they remain law students. Drop outs and graduates who do not pass the
bar would cause no problems if they were distributed randomly with
respect to social class, but it seems likely, almost to the point of certainty, that students of lower SES are disproportionately represented in
these groups. Bar Passage Study data, which both Professor Sander and I
have used, indicates that financial considerations are an important reason
for law school dropout,32 and as Professor Sander's article indicates
lower status students disproportionately populate the nation's lower
status law schools, which are the schools that have the highest failure
rates on state bar exams. For these reasons alone, Professor Sander's
data are likely to underestimate the degree to which students from lower
status backgrounds are admitted to and attend law school. Underestimation for this reason is, however, likely to be minimal in the data relating
to America's most elite schools. Regardless of background, almost all
students at these schools graduate, and pass the bar if they take it. 3 4
A second sample-related problem stems from the two stage stratified random sample that is the basis for the AJD survey. Although it does
a good job of replicating the nation's population of young attorneys
along such lines as gender, practice setting crudely determined, and racial composition,3 1 it may not do as good a job in replicating social class
32. Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis ofAffirmative Action in American Law Schools,
57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 436 (2004); see also David L. Chambers, Timothy T. Clydesdale, William C.
Kidder & Richard 0. Lempert, The Real Impact ofEliminatingAffirmative Action in American Law
Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander's Study, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1855, 1886 n.l 11
(2005).
33.
Sander, supranote 1, at 637-39 & tbl.1.
34. Not everyone who graduates law school takes the bar exam. Some move directly into
positions, like teaching or business management, where they can take advantage of their legal education without having to qualify for legal practice. Yakowitz estimates that 150,000 people have taken
the bar and never passed, but her estimate is admittedly crude. Jane Yakowitz, Marooned: An EmpiricalInvestigation ofLaw School Graduates Who Fail the Bar Exam, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 15-17
(2010). She also drops a gratuitous footnote calling into question data that I and two coauthors
published, which indicated that 94% of University of Michigan Law School graduates (a claim based
on respondents to a survey we conducted which we believe with little loss of accuracy can be generalized to the population of Michigan Law School graduates had passed at least one bar exam,), and
suggests the truer figure is closer to 85%. Id. at 5 n.14 (citing Richard 0. Lempert, David L. Chambers & Terry K. Adams, Michigan's Minority Graduatesin Practice: The River Runs Through Law
School, 25 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 395 (2000)). I do not know how Yakowitz arrived at her number,
but it is wrong. Reports by state bars back to Michigan for the period 2006-2008 indicate that the
overall bar passage rates of Michigan students during these years was a bit more than 96%, and this
is an underestimate since some bar takers were on their second or third attempt. Moreover, bar
passage standards have tightened since the years when we conducted our study. I expect Yakowitz
may have been misled by Michigan's bar passage rates in California, reputedly the nation's most
difficult bar. These rates during the period for which I saw official data are closer to her estimate, but
only a small fraction of Michigan's graduates ever attempt the California Bar. I also know there
were some earlier years when Michigan's California bar passage rates were at or near the best of any
law school, no doubt a function of the students who took jobs in California.
35.

RoNIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE J.D.: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF

LEGAL CAREERS 90 (Janet E. Smith et al., eds., 2004). To get the most accurate estimations the
sample should be adjusted with weights the project provides. Professor Sander's data is unweighted,

696

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:4

distributions. For example, no state from the Deep South is included in
the sample3 6 nor are smaller cities in states like New York, Illinois, and
California, which are represented by samples drawn from their major
legal centers.37 It is possible that unrepresented areas like these are places
where lawyers with lower class backgrounds are particularly likely to be
found and that the sampling units designed to capture some of this variance do not do adequately rectify the imbalance.
I do not want to make too much of this last point. Indeed, I do not
want to make too much of any of the above points, nor am I making them
to criticize Professor Sander's efforts. For the most part, these data shortcomings are hard to avoid and hard to control, and at numerous points in
his article Professor Sander cautions against putting too much stock in
the exact numbers he arrives at. I have tried to flesh out his cautions and
added a few of my own to emphasize that the imprecision Professor
Sander alerts us to may be considerable. For example, Professor Sander's
data suggest that only a minuscule proportion of students at the nation's
elite law schools come from lower SES backgrounds. Yet the University
of Michigan's Dean for Admissions reports that 30% of students entering
the school in the summer or fall of 2010 had one parent with no more
than a high school education and that 13% of the students had no parent
who had gone beyond high school. These numbers may have been
mentioned because they are atypical. Since this is the first time I recall
seeing such information I have no idea whether Michigan's 2010 entering class is atypical in this respect. Yet even if the data are atypical, the
message still stands. Professor Sander's work should be read more for
the forest than for its trees. The numbers he reports may be off by a little
or a lot.
III. THE AMERICAN CLASS STRUCTURE

A fundamental concern is how best to categorize students by class.
Professor Sander treats social class as a continuous variable that spans an
equally spaced 100 point range, which he divides into four quartiles and
sometimes further subdivides for in his analyses. Dividing a sample into
SES quartiles for purposes of analysis and treating SES as a continuum is
an approach sometimes found in efforts to associate SES with particular
beliefs and outcomes. Social scientists have, however, many competing
and while this might introduce a bit more noise, it appears that using unweighted data changes little.
GABRIELE PLICKERT & RONIT DINOVITZER, AFTER THE J.D: FIRST RESULTS REPORT, TECHNICAL
ADDENDUM 1 ( 2007), availableat http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/
weighted ajdreport 9.6.07.pdf.
36. See PLICKERT & DINOVITZER, supra note 34, at 4 (indicating that the border state of
Tennessee, Florida and the cities of Houston and Atlanta were chosen for inclusion).
37. Id. (indicating that New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco are areas
sampled).
38. Sarah Zearfoss, A Snapshot of the Entering Class: 5 Things About the New 1Ls, LAW
QUADRANGLE, Fall 2010, at 1.
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views about the American class structure, and they divide Americans
into different classes in different ways. Dennis Gilbert, for example recognizes six classes. 3 9 He suggests that 12% of the American population
inhabit the underclass, 13% are working poor, 30% are working class,
30% are lower middle class, 14% are upper middle class and 1% belong
to the top tier capitalist class.40 William Thompson and Joseph Hickey
place about 20% of Americans in the lower class, 30% in the working
class, a similar proportion in the lower middle class, 15% in the upper
middle class and 2% in the upper class. 4 1 Leonard Beeghley's estimates
are poor 12%,42 working class 40-45%,43 middle class 46%,44 rich 5%
and superrich .9%.45 John Goldthorpe, who developed the CASMIN
classification scheme which is widely used in comparative class analysis,
identified seven major occupational class groupings, some of which he
broke down into subcategories.4 6 If this variation is not enough, when it
comes to class consciousness results are wildly different. According to a
National Opinion Research Center poll, when asked to self identify their
class status, only 5% of Americans responding said lower class, 45%
said working class, 46% said middle class and 4% said upper class. 4 7
These divisions have remained relatively stable in the years since 1972.48
If I were to continue searching for statistical portraits of class in the
United States, I would find additional definitions and further different
ways of measuring class and assigning people class status. Most, like
those mentioned above, would not divide Americans into four quartiles,
but would see the class structure as one in which there was a small portion of Americans at either extreme and bulges in the intermediate class
or classes. 49 Although Professor Sander's classification scheme may,
39. Dennis Gilbert, The American Class Structure in an Age of Growing Inequality 13 (7th
ed. 2008).
Id. at 13-14.
40.
William E. Thompson & Joseph V. Hickey, Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociol41.
ogy 216-17 (1994).
42. Leonard Beeghley, The Structure of Social Stratification in the United States 239 (4th ed.
2005).
43. Id. at 213.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 160.
46. GORDON MARSHALL, IN PRAISE OF SOCIOLOGY 16 (1990). These groupings are: I)
Higher-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; managers in large industrial establishments; large proprietors; II) Lower-grade professionals, administrators, and officials, higher-grade
technicians; managers in small industrial establishments; supervisors of non-manual employees; I1a)
Routine non-manual employees, higher grade (administration and commerce). IlIb Routine nonmanual employees, lower grade (sales and services); IVa) Small proprietors, artisans, etc., with
employees; IVb) Small proprietors, artisans, etc., without employees; IVc) Farmers and smallholders; other self-employed workers in primary production; V) Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of
manual workers; VI) Skilled manual workers; VHa) Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers (not
in agriculture, etc.); and VIIb) Agricultural and other workers in primary production.
47.
Jack Metzgar, Politics and the American Class Vernacular,WORKINGUSA, June 2003, at
73 tbl.4.
48. Id.
49.
Most class researchers would, however, acknowledge that any categorical breakdown of
class is imperfect, and there can be considerable heterogeneity among those placed in the same
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albeit with some error, situate the year 2000 cohort of law school graduates vis-i-vis the American population in general along an SES continuum, it may do a considerably poorer job in capturing the social class
characteristics of law school graduates as these relate to selfidentification and world views.
Suppose that Professor Sander had complete information not only
on the two items he includes in his SES index but also on the income and
wealth of his respondents' parents and that there was an incontrovertible
way to create from these variables a true SES score that could be used to
map applicants onto the SES distribution of the American population in
general. One would then be able to perfectly assess the degree to which
the SES of year 2000 law graduates matched that of the American population in general as well as how the match varied depending on the status
of the law schools attended. Quartile breaks along the SES continuum
would be one convenient way of illustrating variance. But by many operational as well as conceptual definitions of class, the resulting picture
would not present a true portrait of the prevalence of students with different class backgrounds in America's law schools. Too many students
would be in the top and bottom categories and there would be too few
students in the middle. Moreover, differences in class assignment have
analytic consequences, particularly when the effort is to understand why
the class origins of law school graduates, and in particular graduates of
the more elite law schools, differ so substantially from the overall distribution of class in America.
Thus in seeking to explain why a disproportionately small proportion of all law school graduates and a minuscule proportion of elite law
school graduates have backgrounds that place them in the bottom quartile
of the American class distribution, Professor Sander identifies the role of
potential feeder schools and the class origins of their enrollees as contributing factors.so If, however, Professor Sander had constructed his
lowest class group using Beeghley's estimate of the percentage of
Americans who are poor or Gilbert's definition of the underclass, he
would have found an even smaller proportion of law students came from
the bottom of the class structure, but it is likely that he would have also
social class by whatever coding scheme is used. In Professor Sander's classification scheme, unlike
some other possible schemes, it is obvious that those who place near the bottom of his third quartile
are closer to those in the bottom quartile than they are to those at the top of their class quartile.
Although this information is lost when categorical classifications by quartile are used, it would not
be lost in other forms of quantitative analysis. In fact, there is no single best way to assign people to
positions in a class structure. The most appropriate assignment depends on the purpose behind the
assignment. If, for example, the classic Marxian view of class pertained, and class consciousness
was defined by relationship to means of production, then heterogeneity within a class on dimensions
like education and income would not matter if class consciousness was the key variable. Despite the
heterogeneity on other dimensions, people who stood in the same relationship to means of production would share the same, common class consciousness. However, even for the classic Marxist
theorist the world is seldom so neatly organized.
50. Sander, supra note 1, at 648 tbl.6.
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found that a greater proportion of this shortfall was because students
from these backgrounds seldom made it to or through college. By the
same token, graduates whose SES credentials placed them in the range
where Professor Sander's lowest quartile and Gilbert's working poor
overlapped would not appear to be as underrepresented as one might
surmise from the quartile breakdown. Similarly Sander's second highest
quartile as well as part of his top tier would, using Gilbert's allocation of
people to class, be filled by students from lower middle class backgrounds, the kind who seem to have suffered greatly from the post 2008
economic collapse and hardly an elite group in American society.
Thompson and Hickey would similarly see about 40% of Professor
Sander's top tier as inhabited by students from the lower middle class At
the extreme, if rather than use any sociologist's or economist's scheme,
we chose to locate a student's class roots by self-identification, then Professor Sander's bottom two tiers would be filled almost entirely by students from working class backgrounds and his top two tiers would be
bastions of middle class enrollment, assuming that self-identification
overlapped completely with Professor Sander's SES measure. But it
would not. Thus one would find students whose parents self-identified as
working class scattered throughout Professor Sander's top two tiers, and
some who self-identified as middle class would be in the lowest SES
class quartiles.
I am not advocating for Beeghley's, Gilbert's or any other class
classification scheme. I am not necessarily suggesting that these are better schemes for class analysis than the SES quartile distributions Professor Sander uses. I am saying that the picture one gets of class of representation in American law schools turns on the brush one paints with.
There are many different brushes out there, many if not most of which
are quite different from the brush Professor Sander employs. These
schemes differ not just in the proportion of people allocated to different
spheres, but also conceptually. Professor Sander treats class location as a
continuous variable on which Americans can be given percentile rankings. Others would dispute this.
Perhaps the most important point is that however one subdivides an
SES continuum into class locations, there is a difference between SES as
an operational measure of class and class as a concept. 5t Class typically
denotes commonalities of interests, viewpoints, cultural understandings
and practices that go beyond SES. SES is a measure of social-economic
status that is often used to assign people to classes for want of any better
measures, but it is not the same thing. Discrepancies between the operational and conceptual definitions can matter, as they might, for example,
51.
Professor Sander is far from alone in eliding this difference. Researchers, including text
book writers and top scholars, often treat SES as if it exhausted the meaning of social class, perhaps
because SES more than class lends itself to continuous measurement and percentile distributions.
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if one seeks to increase the number of low SES students in American law
schools in order to increase the number of students whose views diverge
from most of their classmates. It may be that Professor Sander chose to
use CAMSIS coding to minimize the gap between operation and concept. 52
IV. EXPLAINING LOWER CLASS UNDERREPRESENTATION
Before turning to what I regard as the most interesting and important issue raised by Professor Sander's piece, namely, whether America's
law schools should strive for greater class diversity, there are several
other aspects of his piece that invite discussion. The first has to do with
explanations for the underrepresentation of lower SES students at America's law schools in general and at its most elite law schools in particular.
In this connection, Professor Sander identifies law school admissions
practices that in his view may not only fail to give lower SES applicants
a diversity boost but may in fact disadvantage them.53
Professor Sander's list includes legacy preferences, a failure to consider differential grade inflation associated with an undergraduate
school's public-private status and perhaps its overall eliteness, and a subtle preference for people with "interesting records," such as volunteer
services or travel abroad.54 I would add some additional considerations.
One is the sense of accomplishment that being able to attract students
from the most elite undergraduate schools may have for admissions officers, an advantage above and beyond any corrections for undergraduate
institution that a school may use to adjust an admissions index. If this
occurs, underrepresentation of lower SES students at the nation's most
elite colleges and universities will exacerbate their underrepresentation at
America's law schools. Students from low SES backgrounds and law
school applicants from non-elite colleges are likely to be further disadvantaged by the influence of letters of recommendation. They are less
likely than applicants from more advantaged backgrounds to be able to
secure letters from a law school alumni contributors, legislators, Congressmen or other political figures, or professors whose distinction is
recognized by an admissions officer or who are well practiced in the art
52. The CAMSIS coding methodology was designed to tighten the link between occupational
position and social status by using associational information to create its operational prestige scores,
reflecting the notion that class identities are reflected by and rooted in relationships. As I described
above, there exist limitations to the CAMSIS codes, including limitations that emerge when the only
information on personal associations that is available is for husband-wife pairs, as well as the counterintuitive nature of a scale in which the status of an occupation can vary substantially depending on
the gender of the holder. See supranote 31 and accompanying text. (This is not always problematic
since occupational status, however measured, may be differently sorted by gender, but the differential sorting is also likely to be more than occasionally in error.) Nevertheless, I regard Professor
Sander's use of CAMSIS codes as one of a number of ways in which he has attempted to make the
best of what, from a data quality/availability standpoint, is a bad situation.
53.
Sander, supra note 1, at 658-59.
54. Id.
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of writing elite school recommendations. A last and more recently important factor is the increasing tendency of law schools to prefer somewhat older applicants and applicants with advanced degrees. People who
are reasonably well off may be able to afford several years out of the
labor market to pursue advanced degrees or may be able to leave a job
that is paying the bills to get a law degree, but those less well off are
more likely to graduate college in debt and to find that quitting a paying
job, even one with far more limited career prospects than the law, is a
financial impossibility.
My litany of further disadvantages which lower SES applicants may
suffer from in the law school admissions process bolsters Professor
Sander's suggestion that net of other factors admissions officers may
actually give a boost (affirmative action if you will) to students who have
overcome disadvantaged backgrounds, and the boost may be greater than
Professor Sander indicates." Indeed, given that, as Professor Sander
notes, most law schools collect little if any data reflecting class origin,
the boost may actually be substantial in the minority of cases where class
origin, perhaps revealed in a student essay, is known. Any boost, however, would not be "net of other factors," and it might simply offset subtle biases that work against the lower class applicant.
Although Professor Sander presents data on the "SES Eliteness of
Undergraduate Students" 56 to suggest a baseline for his analysis of the
underrepresentation of low SES students in American law schools,57 he
lacks the data needed to illuminate what might major sources of this disparity; namely, the rate at which college graduates from different socioeconomic strata apply to law school and the degree to which professions/occupations are hereditary. Thus one reason why students whose
parents have graduate/professional degrees are overrepresented in law
schools as compared to both the general population and those receiving
baccalaureate degrees may be because children of lawyers are strongly
overrepresented among law school applicants. The only data I have seen
that bear on this come from work by Seymour Warkov that Professor
Sander has cited to show the persistence of class effects. These data are
55.
Sander, supra note 1, at 657 tbl.10. Only one of five differences tested by Professor
Sander would, by convention, be considered even marginally significant, but the finding of marginal
significance must be discounted when there have been five independent tests. Thus the best conclusion to draw from Sander's data is that, in the sample he examined, there is no substantial evidence
of reliable differences in standardized index scores associated with parental background. If the slight
advantage suggested in the data for those whose parent possesses a professional or doctoral degree is
real, it may reflect the ability of a student with a lawyer parent to get letters of recommendation from
school alumni or other influentials, and what may be a greater likelihood among students from
families with doctoral degrees to themselves pursue advanced academic degrees before applying to
law school.
56. Id. at 661 tbl.2.
57. Id. at 648-49 tbls.6 & 7.
58. Id. at 642 tbl.3. Sander draws his data from the book Lawyers in the Making by Seymour
Warkov and Joseph Zelan published in 1965. I could not acquire a copy of this book but have drawn
on the data analysis that forms the basis for the book: SEYMOUR WARKOV, LAWYERS IN THE
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fifty years old, and the situation today may be vastly different. Hence I
do not claim current empirical support for the possibility that a significant portion of the current underrepresentation of lower SES students
relative to their proportion of undergraduate degree holders is due to
their disinterest in applying to law school and their failure to follow up
on possible intentions to apply, but it was a significant factor half a century ago, and the situation may be similar today.
Warkov found, for example, that 41% of those who began their college careers interested in going on to law school came from families with
professionally-headed households compared to 20% of those who began
college aspiring to other careers. 59 Thirty-five percent of these aspiring
lawyers came from families with earnings above $15,000 compared to
12% of those who began college with other future job preferences, 60 and
46% of the fathers of those who aspired to legal careers were college
graduates as opposed to 21% of those with different occupational interests. 6 1 Moreover, switching career aspirations during college and following through on law school attendance exacerbated rather than ameliorated these differences, as did low LSAT scores and poor academic performance, both of which were directly related to Warkov's SES measures. It is a shame that similar data are not available today, and I expect
that no one regrets this more than Professor Sander. But such data are not
available, so we have no good information about the degree to which the
underrepresentation of students from low SES backgrounds is, after controlling for their underrepresentation among college graduates, attributable to disinterest in legal careers among low SES college graduates
rather than other causes.
V. ALLEVIATING THE DISPARITY
Professor Sander offers three suggestions for enhancing the class
diversity of America's law schools and its elite law schools in particular.
The first is to minimize those aspects of the admissions process that disadvantage low SES applicants and to stimulate applications from students with lower SES backgrounds. It is, however, not at all clear that a
law school interested not just in class diversity but in diversity of all sorts
would be well served by ignoring the kinds of information and considerations that Professor Sander and I have listed as possible reasons why
lower SES students may present weaker profiles than higher status applicants with similar GPAs and LSAT. Students with interesting experiences, like working with an NGO in the Sudan, can add greatly to the
MAKING:

THE

1961

ENTRANTS

TO

AMERICAN

LAW

SCHOOLS

(1963),

available at

http://www.norc.uchicago.edulNR/rdonlyres/7DODE824-FD6E-46CA-B72D-AEFFlDEBB6Fl/0/
NORCRpt 96.pdf. This analysis may contain more tables than what were published so I do not
know if the information that follows was available to Professor Sander.
59. Warkov, supra note 58, at 3-4 & tbl.1.2.
60. Id. at 3, 5 tbl.1.3.
Id. at 3, 5 tbl.1.4.
61.
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diversity of perspectives and information in a law school class as can
older students and those with advanced degrees. Similarly, letters of recommendation can have important added value in distinguishing between
the similar "hard" credentials of two applicants. Although giving too
much credit to inflated grades has nothing to commend it, as Professor
Sander notes, it is easy to overstate these effectS6 2 and, I would add, to
understate the difficulty of correcting for differences.6 3
Professor Sander's second suggestion to increase the law school
representation of lower SES students is greater need-based financial aid.
This certainly will not hurt, and for other reasons as well moving toward
more need-based aid has much to commend it.64 However, I do not believe that within the realm of the possible increased financial aid can do
much to alleviate the situation. Black law students today, as Sander
notes, do better than students of other ethnic groups, when it comes to
receiving scholarship support in lieu of loans, but compared to students
of other ethnicities a higher proportion of black students graduate with

62. Sander, supranote 1, at 659.
63.
Stuart Rojstaczer and Christopher Healy (whose article Professor Sander cites at his
footnote 75) find reliable distinctions between average grade inflation in schools of different types
(e.g. public-private), but the amount of inflation varies within school types, so that a satellite public
school may have grades that are more inflated than those at an elite private college or flagship public
university. See Stuart Rojstaczer & Christopher Healy, Grading in American Colleges and Universities, TcHRs. C. REc., Mar. 4, 2010, at 2-3. Additionally, grade inflation varies by fields within
universities and these differences will often be greater than grade inflation variation across college
and university types. Id. at 3. Moreover, if this is not complex enough, it could be that within fields
broadly defined grade inflation varies by major. For example, Rojstaczer and Healy's data indicate
that grade inflation is greatest in the humanities where after controlling for likely student ability
grades tend on average to be .4 higher than in the natural sciences and .2 higher than in the social
sciences. Id. A Classics major in a particular school may, however, have grades that are less inflated
than the grades of most other humanities majors and of some or all natural science majors depending
on the school and its professors. Admissions officers whom I have known have had a sense of the
degree of grade inflation by school and by major, or at least of the law school relevant abilities that
grades reflect. Indeed, where admissions officers have dealt with numerous students from a handful
of feeder schools over a sufficiently long period of time, some have developed a sense of grade
inflation not just by school and by major but sometimes also by professor, along with a professorspecific sense of"letter of recommendation inflation," or, on occasion, deflation.
64. My recollection is that when I first started teaching, most law school financial aid, to the
extent it existed at all, was need-based and the expectation of repayment was presented as a moral
rather than a legal obligation. Later competition for the most able minority students resulted in
financial aid packages for the apparently most able that had a significant non-need component. Still
later, competition for students with the kinds of credentials that boosted U.S. News rankings led to a
broadening of non-need-based awards to all students. These shifts were also supported and perhaps
fostered by the increasing availability of student loans, which meant that students willing to take on
debt could attend law school even without scholarship aid. At some elite schools, like my home
school the University of Michigan, recognition that whether or not a loan was easily met depended
on the career path a law student chose or was forced into, meant that some of what might have been
scholarship aid was channeled to loan forgiveness programs that evaluated need for assistance as it
in fact existed after graduation. Originally, this was done to enable law school graduates to take
relatively low paying public interest jobs. However, since the need for loan repayment assistance
depends on income level and not employment type and from a reluctance to evaluate different careers by reference to their social value post law school, earned income became the key to postgraduation financial assistance. I believe much the same trajectory characterizes the history of financial support at many of the nation's wealthiest and most selective law schools.
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debt, and the amount they owe is on average greater. 6 5 Unless substantial
new need-based support were available to law schools, including those
below the most elite levels, I expect the situation would be the same for
66
those from lower SES backgrounds as it is for today's black students.
This leaves admission preferences, or affirmative action, as the most
promising means for increasing the proportion of students from low SES
backgrounds in America's law schools, especially the more selective/elite institutions. To show what can be accomplished, Professor
Sander offers evidence from an experiment with class-based affirmative
action that he was instrumental in developing for UCLA Law School
after the passage of California's proposition 209 threatened to decimate
UCLA's minority law student population. He characterizes the experiment's results as a "success" and as "remarkable." 6 7 I cannot adjudicate
the truth of his characterization, but I can report that I was part of a group
that was given a briefing about the results of this experiment, and the
briefer regarded the experiment as anything but a success. To begin with,
the UCLA admissions office apparently did not adequately account for
the increased yield that would result from extending offers to the affirmative action beneficiaries and so enrolled, if I recall correctly, almost
100 students more than they would ordinarily admit. Moreover, the
students admitted through this program were overwhelmingly Asian,
who benefited from the fact that their parents who were often immigrants
raised in other cultures, who had limited formal education and resided in
relatively impoverished if culturally rich immigrant communities.
Although the potential loss of most of its black student population was
the prime motivator of the plan for many faculty, including (I have been
told) Professor Sander, only five black students enrolled for the following fall term,69 and Hispanic enrollment was also way down. Because of
these outcomes the faculty decided to discontinue the experiment.
VI.

THE QUESTIONABLE VALUE OF CLASS DIVERSITY

This brings me to what I regard as the most interesting issue raised
by Professor Sander's article: whether law schools have good reason, and
in particular good diversity reasons, to increase the proportion of their
entering students who come from lower SES backgrounds. I am dubi65. WILDER, supra note 25, at 58 tbl.36.
66. There is also the question of whether we would be doing lower SES students any favors
by encouraging more to attend law school. See Segal, supra note 6 (noting the financial difficulties
faced by law students graduating with high debt and low job prospects).
67. Sander, supranote 1, at 662-63.
68. Part of the excess was due to the fact that the school was still enrolling better off white
students through the summer to keep its U.S. News rankings up.
69. The five black students were originally spread across UCLA's four first year sections. The
students, I have been told, came to the dean the day before classes began and asked to be placed in
the same section since they felt that the pressures of being the only black in a sea of White and Asian
faces would put too much pressure on them. Their request was granted, meaning that one first year
section had meaningful black representation and the other three sections had none.

2011]

REFLECTIONS

705

tante. Moreover, regardless of the case that can be made for social class
diversity, I believe that it pales next to the case that can be made for social and ethnic diversity. 70 In addressing the unconditional and comparative cases that can be made for social class diversity, I shall concern myself only with the situation of the nation's most selective law schools
(Professor Sander's top two tiers). Even if those from lower class backgrounds are underrepresented in less selective law schools, they are still
present in numbers sufficient to provide substantial class background
diversity.7 1 I shall also ignore actions other than affirmative action to
increase class diversity, some of which I would be happy to see.72
Earlier I suggested three kinds of reasons that might be offered in
defense of affirmative action. The first are fairness reasons. Background
70.
I agree with several of the points that Professor Sander makes in comparing class-based
and race-based affirmative action. I regard as most likely true his suggestions that to attain similar
"minority" representation, when the minority is those of low SES, preferences would not need to be
as steep as they are when the preferred group is a racial or ethnic minority. (I use the hedging words
most likely only because I am unsure of the implications of class-based differences in law school
attendance and because much depends on how one defines class. I don't think I would as readily
assign a place in the lower class to the children of immigrants from many Asian and some other
countries even if by the SES measures Professor Sander uses they are in the lower ranks. If instead
of this measure we were considering students from families with deeply sunk lower SES or class
roots, like Appalachian whites or urban unskilled laborers, I am not at all certain that the preferences
needed to admit a representative proportion to law schools of varying strata would be any less than
they are for other minorities, and I would not be surprised if they were in fact greater.) I also agree
that in the current political climate class-based preferences would be better received by the public
than race or ethnicity-based preferences and that since class is not a suspect classification, classbased affirmative action would, at least given the current Supreme Court, rest on firmer constitutional grounds. I also agree that in today's increasingly multi-racial nation there are challenges in
identifying who is Hispanic, Native American or black, for purposes of affirmative action, but I
believe that class too has its ambiguities and problems of definition and that we are fooling ourselves
if we think that crude SES measures define America's lower classes. Where I completely part company from Professor Sander is on his claims of black disadvantage resulting from affirmative action
by the nation's more elite law schools and in his suggestion that mismatch is at the core of the problem. Professor Sander and I (and coauthors) along with others who have looked at a range of data
have gone back and forth for some years now on these issues. I remain convinced that Professor
Sander's mismatch thesis is largely if not entirely unsupported and is, if anything, least applicable to
the nation's most elite law schools. I have no desire to rehearse this particular dispute here, but refer
the reader to our mutual contributions to the debate and to works cited therein. See generally Sander,
supra note 32; Chambers, Clydesdale, Kidder & Lempert, supra note 32; Richard H. Sander, A
Reply to Critics, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1963 (2005); Richard Lempert, William Kidder, Timothy T.
Clydesdale & David L. Chambers, Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: A Critical Response to Richard Sander's- A Reply to Critics (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper
No. 06-001, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=886382##.
71.
Black and Hispanic law students are similarly underrepresented relative to their population proportions in almost all the nation's law schools, but a "critical mass" for diversity purposes
has never been defined as a proportional presence equal to the group's population proportion.
72.
There are actions schools could take which would have as an expected outcome an increase in lower SES representation, but they do not involve preferences, in the sense of admitting a
student of lower SES ahead of a higher SES student with a higher LSAT/GPA index score. Professor
Sander has identified some of them. One example is eliminating legacy advantages. A second, which
would require funding at a level that I think no law school can afford but which a few wealthy undergraduate colleges manage: it is to run a needs blind admissions system and guarantee students
that if admitted their needs will be met mainly with scholarship aid. A third is to broaden recruitment
to include active outreach not just to a group of select feeder schools but to undergraduate schools
which those from lower SES backgrounds are disproportionately likely to attend. I think each of
these approaches has much to commend it, but each has financial costs that must be recognized.
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factors may mean that some people have a harder time than others in
getting to the point where they could contemplate a career in the law and
become eligible for admission to law school. Moreover, a disadvantaged
background may have created obstacles to achievement such that a person's efforts and intelligence do not yield credentials that are as impressive as those that a similarly skilled more advantaged person can present.
For example, a student who has had to work almost full time while in
school to pay her college tuition may have grades below those of fellow
students whose parents paid their way even though she is smarter and
worked harder than others throughout her college career. Or one student's LSAT score may be below another's because her parents could
not afford an LSAT prep course, or because among her friends and acquaintances there was no one to tell her that taking a course prep might
better her chances of being admitted to a top tier law school.
Second are educational enrichment reasons. A student body containing people from diverse backgrounds, with diverse interests and views, is
likely to provide everyone with a richer education than they would get at
a more homogeneous institution. More points of view will be expressed
in the classroom, more students will have specialized knowledge that
illuminates legal problems, the richness and diversity of extracurricular
educational opportunities will be greater and students will gain a broader
view of the world from meeting and befriending people who are unlike
them.
Finally, diversity among law school graduates, and among the
graduates of the more selective law schools in particular, may have important social benefits. Segments of society may have greater access to
lawyers and access to better trained lawyers than they would have if law
school populations were less diverse, with people like them more seriously underrepresented. More pro bono work may be done. The views
and interests of disadvantaged social groups may be more adequately
represented at the highest levels of business, government, the military
and in society in general. Role models may lead young people observing
law graduates like them to aspire higher, and they may open doors that
might previously have been closed to them.
Of these reasons, only the first seems likely to be enhanced greatly
by affirmative action programs that give preferences to applicants from
lower SES backgrounds. Even here, however, matters are not simple. To
begin with we should recognize that to some extent preferences for applicants in this first category should not be considered affirmative action.
For example, as an aid to judging a person's capacity for success in law
school and beyond, a formula which increased an applicant's GPA by a
tenth of a point for every ten hours they worked each week as undergraduates or which increased LSAT scores by a quarter of a standard
deviation for those who did not take a prep course might do a better job
of predicting than a formula that ignored these factors. Similarly, the
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initiative and strength of character demonstrated by a student who had
numerous financial and cultural obstacles to overcome to even attend
college, much less law school, might indicate someone who will contribute more to her fellow students and to the legal profession than a student
whose superior GPA and LSAT scores correctly predict to a better law
school GPA.
Admissions officers and admissions committee members recognize
these and similar considerations; indeed it is not much of a stretch to say
they live for them. It is the ability to evaluate the "whole student" that
makes their life interesting and means the task of deciding whom to admit cannot be delegated to a computer. When personal history leads to
the belief that a student has academic capabilities not captured by her
GPA or LSAT score, or when an applicant stands out for special accomplishments, 73 admissions officers and committees have no compunctions
about preferring such applicants to those with somewhat better "numbers." Hence to the extent that students from lower SES backgrounds are
admitted because hurdles they have overcome suggest that other aspects
of the credentials they present do adequately capture their capabilities,
affirmative action is not playing a part in the decision.
Affirmative action, or admitting someone who would not be admitted but for her status along a certain dimension, 7 4 occurs when one presumes disadvantage because an applicant has a certain class background
or believes that even if an applicant's LSAT/academic index accurately
portrays the student's academic ability relative to competing applicants
the student deserves a thumb on the scales because her background
handicapped her in her efforts to become as strong academically as competing applicants. Thus a person whose local schools provided an inferior
K-12 education is likely to be less well educated than someone who be73.
At Michigan, for example, the list of such students could go on and on. It would include
an Olympic gold medalist, a physician in his 50s who was a leader of the AMA, a concert pianist, a
top chess player, and the like.
74. By this definition beneficiaries of affirmative action include in many schools people of a
certain race or ethnic background, most commonly blacks, Hispanics and Native Americans, some
legacy admits and in the case of public colleges and universities some in-state residents. It would
also not surprise me, although I have no data, if some religiously supported institutions give preferences to applicant's who share the institution's religious views. The possibility of religiously based
affirmative action has not been examined because the schools that may practice this are private, and
data relating to their applicant and admissions pool is not available for study, and we don't speak of
affirmative action in the case of legacy admits or in-state residents because the preferential admission of students in these categories has long been regarded as non-problematic. (This view is being
challenged with respect to legacy admits.) Also it is generally believed that preferences accorded
legacies and in-state applicants are not as great as those enjoyed by the beneficiaries of race or
ethnicity-based affirmative action. This is, I am sure, true on the average, but there are cases where
some legacies, or in-state students with powerful governmental backers, have enjoyed preferences as
large as those enjoyed by most minority students. Moreover, at Michigan which is the school I know
best, the distance between the index credentials of the average in-state admit and those of the bottom
10 tb percentile non-resident admits has often, and perhaps over the past two decades always, been
greater than the distance between the bottom 10 h' percentile resident admit and the average minority
admit.
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fore college attended high performing public or elite private schools, and
a person whose grades suffered because she had to work full time in college may in fact have learned less, be less able to adroitly apply her native intelligence and be less ready for law school than someone who,
because her parents paid her way, had more time for learning. Fairness
considerations might still lead to a preference for the applicant from the
poorer background because she achieved more and has more promise,
not absolutely but relative to the hand life dealt her.
Some might argue that although it is appropriate to consider
whether a person's background indicates that she will perform at a higher
level than her admissions index might predict, it is not the business of
law schools to compensate an applicant, in even a small way, for the fact
that because of class-based or other inherited disadvantage she is, insofar
as we can tell, less educationally and intellectually accomplished than a
competing applicant. I am not in this group and am not troubled by decisions to offset to some degree the effects of structurally rooted educational disadvantage for reasons of fairness and equality promotion.75
Problems arise, however, because applicants identified as low SES
by available measures may not be those whom the fairness/equality case
for affirmative action justifies admitting, nor may they be people who
because of their cultural or educational disadvantage are better prospects
for legal education than their admissions index scores indicate.76 For
The open question is what does "to some degree" mean. I can't state this more precisely
75.
but I can say that I don't find the fact that the UCLA experiment which Professor Sander describes
advantaged those defined as low SES applicants by the equivalent of about 40 LSAT index points
troublesome.
76. This is particularly likely if the SES index, like the one Professor Sander uses in his study,
omits information on family wealth and parental income. The problem of overinclusiveness is common to all sorts of affirmative action but can only be determined with reference to specific justifications. To take an innocuous example, affirmative action at state schools for state residents can be
justified on the ground that the parents of such applicants have been paying state taxes in support of
their colleges and universities for years in order to be able to better educate their children. But an in
state preference will be granted to a person who moved to the state eighteen months before applying
to law school and who has paid little if any state taxes. Alternatively the justification could be that
the state needs a highly educated work force to prosper and state residents educated in state are more
likely to remain residents after graduation than those who move to the state solely to get an education. If only tax equity justified residency preferences including the recent mover in the applicant
pool benefiting from residence-related affirmative action would be an example of overinclusion. If
the sole justification were the "stay and work" justification and if recent movers are as likely to
remain residents after graduation as those raised in state, then including the recent mover in the
group eligible for residency-based affirmative action would be consistent with the affirmative action
justification. Professor Sander at several points in is article suggests that race and ethnicity-based
affirmative action programs suffer from serious problems of overinclusion. He points out, for example, that minority admits at elite law schools have SES credential distributions that are relatively
close to those of the average white, Sander, supra note 1, at 651 tbl.8, and are overwhelmingly intraracially elite, Id. at 21 tbl.9. He also faults programs at schools like Harvard for treating as black for
affirmative action purposes applicants from the West Indies or of West Indian parentage and students who may call themselves black but have one or more white grandparents. See id. at 665 &
n.92. With respect to the latter groups, I would argue that so long as society characterizes such
students as black regardless of their personal histories or how they racially self- identify, the equity
justification for affirmative action cannot be totally rejected, and the two other affirmative action
justifications I discuss below remain.
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example Professor Sander reports that his attempt to give an affirmative
action boost to low SES applicants helped mainly applicants of Asian
descent. Most of them I expect were children of immigrants who came to
America in search of better lives for themselves and their families. Like
the children of Jewish immigrants of who came to this country between
the late 1880s and the 1920s, their parents were by occupational, income/wealth and parental education measures at the bottom of America's
class structure. But their families had not been nested there for generations, and their attitudes and opportunities are unlikely to have been the
same as those of families whose heritage is working the unskilled trades
and always being near the bottom of the social ladder. Indeed, for some
Asian and other immigrant families the implications of the SES variables
used as indicators of social class may have been the opposite of what
they were taken to imply. In the United States, for example, achieving
only a high school education characterizes people found in the nation's
two lowest SES quartiles. In some countries completing high school may
mean that the person is just a notch below the countries' educationally
most elite. Similarly a family that is impoverished upon immigrating
here may have been wealthy in their homeland, and their attitudes may
have been and remained those of upper class individuals.
Asian (and other) immigrant families, like Jewish immigrant families before them, are likely to have seen education, and especially professional education, as a route that would lift their children, and through
their children themselves, out of poverty. Moreover, like the generation
of Yiddish speaking Jews, their isolation as a community through language and culture may have offered them access to informal sources of
credit and entrepreneurial opportunities that other low SES Americans
lack.77 In addition, immigrant families often have relatives who preceded
them here and have achieved some measure of financial success and
intergenerational mobility. These relatives may serve both as role models
and as sources of financial support for nieces, nephews and cousins who
might be seen, if SES is the measure, as coming from families near the
bottom of America's class structure.
Professor Sander questions the appropriateness of including Caribbean-born and multi-racial blacks in black-oriented affirmative action
programs. He writes that although it may be true "that Caribbean-born
blacks, or blacks with both white and black parents . . . contribute to the

diversity of a law school class, it is hard to see why they should be
grouped, demographically, with blacks who are American-born and have
predominantly black ancestry."7 The same can be said of many of those
who would qualify as lower class by measured SES, including not just
77.
The AJD data indicate that Asian students received 28% of their support while attending
law school from their families. Whites on average received only 19% of their support while in law
school from their families and blacks only 9%. WILDER, supra note 25, at 59 tbl.37.
78.
Sander, supranote 1, at 665.
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Asians and other immigrants, but some native-born whites as well. 79
Why should they be grouped demographically with children from families that have a history of poverty?
Professor Sander explains the disproportionate presence among
Harvard's black enrollees of students who are foreign born, multiracial
or the children of immigrants by the fact that blacks with these characteristics have higher test scores than blacks who grow up in this country. An
analogous outcome is for the same reason likely to be true of the beneficiaries of low SES affirmative action if SES is conventionally measured." Thus class-based affirmative action programs might most help
those students who are least disadvantaged by their class origins. A program that more closely targeted students with backgrounds that suggest
an enmeshed lower class heritage would, however, have a smaller pool
of potential admittees and would most likely have to provide relatively
large preferences to substantially boost target representation.
The kinds of equity considerations I mention above are, despite the
difficulties that exist, not only the ones that most easily justify classbased affirmative action, but also ones best suited to the use of parental
SES as an indicator of student social class. When it comes to contributing to diversity within law schools and to social contributions beyond
law school, class-based affirmative action may add little of value and far
less than affirmative action for members of historically disadvantaged
minority racial or ethnic groups. One reason for this lies in the gap between SES as a measure of social class and social class as a concept re82
~ otnb
flecting distinct perspectives and experiences. As will often be true of
immigrant's children, SES may only imperfectly reflect the attitudes and
79. In making this point, I have focused on students of Asian heritage since they were the
group predominantly benefited by the short-lived UCLA experiment, but not all whites who are in
the country's lower SES ranks at the time they apply to law school come from families that have
occupied these ranks all their lives. For example, while a student is in college one parent may have
become unemployed and the other may have been laid off from a well-paying highly skilled position
and been only able to find work as a low paid unskilled clerk.
80. Professor Sander's indicators, with income and perhaps family wealth added, might be the
only reliable indicators of social class that a law school could acquire. Professor Sander also used
census tract data in his UCLA experiment, but low average income census tracts may have pockets
of better off residents.
81.
One can still cite equity considerations to argue that students disadvantaged by their
family's low SES status deserve a social mobility boost even if their parent's low SES does not
closely relate to what one might regard as class-linked perspectives and experiences. But refusing to
entertain affirmative action as a mobility booster does not necessarily thwart social mobility; it
simply extends and delays it. Thus many Jews of my parents' generation went to law school, often at
night, and became the lawyers who populated the lower ranks of the bar. Despite their professional
degrees many fared poorly in economic and other ways. But their children were often able to attend
better law schools or follow other entrepreneurial and professional paths that enabled them to move
into careers that placed them well within the ranks of America's upper middle class. To look at the
first generation only, upward mobility attributable to professional training was for many, except to
the extent mobility was defined by professional degrees, not much greater than that enjoyed by the
children of push cart fathers who opened their own shops. Over two generations, however, mobility
was substantial and lower SES origins were left far behind.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
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experiences that make for distinct class-based experiences and perspectives. Thus an elite law school that wished to maximize the diversity of
attitudes, values and experiences within its student body might find that
gains from class-based affirmative action would not be great.
Indeed I think "not be great" overstates likely gains in viewpoint diversity. Students choose to go to college; they choose within limits set by
financial and other constraints which college to attend, and they choose
to apply to law school. Even putting aside the questionable assignment to
the lower class of immigrants' children and the children of parents who
have moved from higher SES families of origin to the lower regions of
the SES scale, students from lower class backgrounds who apply to the
more elite law schools may have attitudes and perspectives that are quite
different from the perspectives of those with apparently similar class
roots who did not attend college or, if they did go to college, did not apply to law school.84 Indeed, students from lower class backgrounds who
apply to and attend elite law schools may by the time they reach law
school have largely shed their lower class identities. Elite law schools,
for example, draw a disproportionate number of their enrollees from elite
undergraduate colleges, and, in particular from Ivy League or similarly
prestigious institutions. A student of lower class origins who enters Yale
or Princeton necessarily differs in class-relevant ways from age mates of
similar SES and may by the time he graduates have attitudes, aspirations,
speech habits and mannerisms more like his Eli or Tiger classmates than
like those of the people he grew up with. Recruiting from Ivy League and
equally elite undergraduate institutions may, from a diversity perspective
yield meager returns no matter what a student's class origins or the current SES of a student's parents. Lower class graduates of elite schools
will not stand out in the law school crowd and may not only have already
have shifted their attitudes to be more like those of their more privileged
peers but will also have shared with them many of their most important
recent life experiences.

83.
I do not think there is one set of experience or viewpoints that characterizes all or even
most members of a particular social class or of a racial or ethnic group for that matter. Nor do people
who fall into the same social class as defined by SES necessarily have the same interests much less
political, religious or other preferences. It is possible, however, to link statistically attitudes and
experiences with class location and to find systematic differences between classes in how these are
distributed.
84. I know of no good current data that would shed reliable empirical light on this matter. The
Warkov data discussed at note 58 supra suggests this supposition is reasonable.
85. I do not mean to suggest that all differences between lower class and more privileged law
students will be wiped out by a shared elite education. Commenting on an earlier version of this
piece, Deborah Malamud pointed out that the family situation of the low-SES law student will not
rapidly change and that a student's continued involvement with family may shape her attitudes and
behavior. I am sure she is right and that this example is not unique. Moreover, people differ. I have
no doubt that some students from lower class backgrounds with elite undergraduate educations make
distinct contributions to a law school's education environment which students from more advantaged
backgrounds could not or would not make. Similarly, to qualify an argument below, there are no
doubt students from low SES backgrounds who go on to high paying, high status careers but who
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The situation is not the same for most beneficiaries of race and ethnicity-based affirmative action. A black student may wish his blackness
were invisible in a law school crowd, but it cannot be, and this is true
even for students of mixed race raised mainly by a white parent." Whatever one's interior racial or ethnic identity, others will assign a racial and
sometimes an ethnic identity regardless. Black students whose views and
identities are like those of most of their white counterparts still contribute
uniquely to a school's diversity because their views are likely to be interpreted in the context of their race, often adding to a discussion in ways
that differ from what would have been added had white students said the
same things.
Moreover, whatever a black student's self-identity or however much
his opinions are like those of white law students, he will have experiences as a student that he would not have had if he were white. Lower
SES students will, by contrast, blend into the student body, and in most
settings students find themselves in they will be responded to according
to race, gender and/or age rather than according to class status. Take dating as an example. The sight of a black law student dating a white law
student may trigger involuntary staring or even intentionally insulting
behavior. This will occur regardless of how similar the daters' class
backgrounds. But, except perhaps in family contexts, no heads will turn
if an upper class white student is out with a student from the bottom of
the SES pecking order. Casual observers will simply not know. If this
example seems trivial, consider that no one has ever posited a crime of
"driving while lower class," but blacks regardless of social status have
testified to the "crime" of "driving while black." The relevance of the
latter experience to discussions of criminal procedure is obvious.
A good test of the contribution that different bases for affirmative
action make to educational diversity is to note the various extracurricular
learning opportunities that exist in law schools. Numbers of the more
specialized journals that exist at Michigan and other law schools have
because of their own backgrounds not only remain concerned with the situations of low SES individuals but also work to better their conditions. Nevertheless, I still maintain that with respect to
diversity standpoint an elite law school is likely to get fewer benefits from admitting more lower
SES students than one might expect and fewer benefits than those gained by ensuring the presence of
a critical mass of minority law students. I believe the same will be true of post-graduation societal
benefits. Moreover, I would not be surprised if a large proportion of low SES students bring nothing in the way of an educational or societal diversity payoff. I recognize, however, that these are
empirical claims, and we lack empirical evidence.
Barack Obama's, Dreams from My Father, which chronicles his development of a black
86.
identity provides as good an example of the push toward blackness as 1 can think of. Recently,
however, there has been some pushback, as more young people of mixed heritage are asserting a
multiracial identity. Susan Saulny, Black? White? Asian? More Young Americans Choose All of the
Above, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,2011, at Al.
For example the views of a black student who thinks affirmative action for blacks is
87.
unconstitutional will contribute uniquely to a discussion because unlike the same views expressed by
whites, supporters of affirmative action will be unable to dismiss the black student's views as just
ractsm.
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racial or ethnic themes or are devoted to issues, like immigration, that are
a special concern of a particular racial or ethnic group. Courses have
been created with a similar impetus, and student groups organized along
racial or ethnic lines bring in speakers to talk about issues that specially
concern them. But participation in such activities and events is not limited in either theory or practice to students from the racial or ethnic group
that was an activity's primary driver. Thus at Michigan and other law
schools, organized groups of black, Hispanic and Native American students have added to every student's educational opportunities.
I do not know how many students from the lower quartile of the
SES distribution have attended Michigan in a typical year, but I am confident there have been more low SES students than students of Native
American heritage, and given Michigan's in-state preferences and blue
collar and rural populations along with a substantial Muslim immigrant
population I expect that in most years there have been at least as many
low SES students as there have been black or Hispanic students." Yet
the school has never started a low SES law journal, nor have there been
groups organized along SES lines to invite speakers to the law school or
to ask for the creation of new courses. I also do not recall ever hearing a
non-minority student explicitly reference a personal experience associated with his family's poverty or low SES. 89
The situation is likely to be similar when we turn to the third justification for affirmative action at elite law schools: giving back, or the contributions a school's graduates make to the community and the larger
society following graduation.90 If Michigan graduates typify the graduates of elite schools, there is strong evidence that lawyers of a given ethnic background (including Asians and whites) disproportionately serve
people of their own race, whether they are dealing with them as individual clients or as business contacts.9 ' Moreover, affirmative action eligible
minority graduates tend to be more deeply involved in community service and politics and do more pro bono work than white alumni.92 It is
If black and Hispanic students from low SES backgrounds count for class diversity as well
88.
as racial/ethnic diversity I expect there has often been greater numbers from the nation's lowest SES
quartile.
89. It is possible that making social-economic status salient by adopting an affirmative action
program for students in the bottom quartile of the SES scale would by making SES salient lead to the
creation of groups that would organize to achieve these ends, but unlike the situation with blacks,
Hispanics or Native Americans there has been no serious call for the creation of such preferences
either within or external to the law school community. I am, of course, here talking personally and
anecdotally. No doubt there are occasions where students reference personal experiences stemming
from an impoverished background. Perhaps had I taught welfare law rather than evidence I would
have heard such stories, but even then I expect a good portion of them would have come from minority students.
90. Let me remind the reader that I am talking about moral/policy justifications for affirmative action and not simply those justifications that the law as currently interpreted recognizes as
compelling state interests.
91.
See Lempert, Chambers & Adams, supra note 10, at 438 tbls.18 & 19.
92. Id. at 457-58 tbls.26 & 27.
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doubtful whether elite law school graduates from lower SES backgrounds would show a similar disproportionate tendency to serve people
like them if for no other reason than the fact that most elite law school
graduates go into business or other large law firm practices, corporate
counsel's offices or government attorney positions.
Moreover, minority graduates do not attend elite law schools expecting to leave their race behind. If anything, they may think that the
elite law school credential will help elevate them to leadership status
within their race and as representatives of their race in the larger community. But low SES students who attend elite law schools are seeking
and will obtain a credential that will allow them to transform their class
identity from low to high and guarantee that their children will have a
better head start on life than their parents were able to provide for them.
There are also societal benefits from role modeling and minority
identity that the beneficiaries of race- or ethnicity-based affirmative action provide but which beneficiaries of a low SES affirmative action program would be unlikely to provide. In part this is due to visibility. It is
likely that virtually all black youth perceive President Obama, Attorney
General Holder and others among his key law-trained advisors as black,
but how many low SES youth know (or care) which of the President's
cabinet members or advisers began life in the lower rungs of society? By
the time these people have acquired sufficient status and connections to
be appointed to high visibility positions, they are no longer people of low
SES, and when a politician trots out his humble roots it seems to be more
as a matter of political theatre than a disclosure that will inspire lower
SES youth to think they can escape their status. In addition, as the business and military amicus briefs in Grutter argued, well trained and educated minorities can be crucial to the success of an operation that involves soldiers or other people of color. It is hard to imagine a similar
need for well-educated leaders whose specific advantage is that they
came from families of humble origin.
In short, I think that most of the values and considerations that justify affirmative action for discriminated against or otherwise disadvantaged ethnic groups do not exist or, if they do exist are not nearly as
strong when applied to students from low SES backgrounds. The overlap
is greatest when equity and fairness are the rationale, but even here issues arise that might give us pause about instituting such programs, often
issues that have analogies in the unease some express about race and
ethnicity-based affirmative action. I do not, however, oppose outreach to,
and informal affirmative action for, students of low SES, especially by
elite law schools. But I do not think formal programs are necessary, and I
do not think the case for low SES affirmative action is nearly as strong as
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the case that can be made for affirmative action in aid of groups disadvantaged by racial and ethnic discrimination. 93
CONCLUSION
I hope it is clear from what I have written that I admire Professor
Sander's effort to shed empirical light on the class composition of the
student bodies in America's law schools. At the same time I think the
amount of light he can shed is severely limited by the nature and quality
of the data he had available and by the distance between SES as a measure of social class and the concept of social class that is best suited to
considering the value and extent of class diversity in legal education. I
have tried to show the limits of what the data can tell us by fleshing out
some of the reasons why readers should take seriously the cautions Professor Sander provides throughout his article.
Specifically, I think the core findings Professor Sander reports, that
students from families of low SES are underrepresented in American law
schools relative to their population proportion and that this underrepresentation is most substantial in America's most elite law schools, are
sound, but that the specific numbers he provides cannot be relied on. I
also believe that some of his subsidiary findings, such as his effort to
determine applicant pool effects on SES representation or his attempt to
assign law graduates of different races and ethnicities to different social
classes are problematic due to missing sample data, his operationalization of social class by an SES index that is less than ideal and other conceptual and data quality issues.
Moving from his empirical results to his more discursive commentary, I think Professor Sander has provided plausible reasons why the
ordinary law school admissions process may bias and diminish the admissions chances of applicants from low SES backgrounds, and I have
added to the reasons he gives. As Professor Sander suggests, a plausible
result of these biases is that even if law school admissions officers seek
consciously to advantage applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds, as
they well might, low SES applicants on balance gain little if anything
from their status. Finally, I take a different view than Professor Sander of
the relative gains from racial/ethnic as opposed to SES diversity and on
justifications for affirmative action. I think a similar case for affirmative
action may be made on fairness grounds, but I think that in terms of educational and societal benefits racial/ethnic diversity, especially at elite
law schools, has far more to offer.

93.
Some who oppose race-based affirmative action think that discrimination and its effects
are a thing of the past. This is not so. For a summary of recent findings and data, see Richard Lempert, A PersonalOdyssey Toward a Theme: Race and Equality in the United States: 1948-2009, 44
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 431,440-55 (2010).
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The data Professor Sander has to work with are flawed and limited,
but he has not pushed the data as far as he might. Specifically, he might
provide empirical answers to some of the questions I raise. For example,
I am concerned that his SES index is less reliable when it is based on two
measures rather than four. He might test this by comparing the SES distribution of students for whom he has four measures with the distribution
of students for whom he has only two, and by seeing if regardless of
measure the association between SES and school presence by school
status is the same. 9 4 More interestingly, the AJD data allow Professor
Sander to test my supposition that racial and ethnic diversity are more
likely to be associated with attitudinal breadth in elite law schools than
SES diversity. The AJD asked several questions designed to tap respondents' opinions, and Professor Sander could explore whether within law
school strata opinion differences are systematically associated with class,
race, ethnic or gender divisions.
Regrettably, for those interested in pursuing Professor Sander's inquiry into the role social class plays in the production of lawyers, the
quality of legal education and the sorting of students into schools of different status, available data are unlikely to allow us to move much beyond what Professor Sander's current study provides.95 What is needed is
a longitudinal study, like the one Warkov conducted 50 years ago,96
which follows a large sample of students from secondary school, through
college and law school, with questions aimed at determining the role that
social class plays in the choice of law as a career, in law school choice
among those committed to a legal career and ultimately in the production
and job sorting of attorneys. Such a study could also explore the effects
of race and gender and determine how various status effects are conditioned by the interplay of other variables. If Professor Sander's foray into

94. If there are differences, they will not necessarily mean that using an SES index composed
of only two measures distorts a true picture, for it could be that the number of available measures is
itself an indicator of SES. If this were the case, one might, for example, expect those whose scores
were based on only two variables to contain a higher proportion of the respondents of low SES than
one finds when four measures are available. Still, it would be a comfort if the relationships Professor
Sander reports were robust to differences in index construction.
95.
There are some data sources that might be explored to see if they offer anything of value.
The most prominent are the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study
and the Longitudinal Study of Youth.
96. WARKOV, supra note 58.
In his reply Professor Sander responds at several points to my critique and at one point, in his discussion of mismatch, to issues of little relevance to the issues central to this symposium. Not only do
I find aspects of Professor Sander's response insulting, but also portions of his reply ignore relevant
information, make empirical claims that I could not replicate with that I believe are better data, and
are in my view seriously flawed in their assumptions and reasoning. These are strong claims, but
unfortunately the Law Review does not have space to allow me to justify them here. However, a
detailed justification is available at http://www.denverlawreview.org/. The reader should know that I
shared most of the claims I make regarding Professor Sander's mismatch discussion insofar as it
accuses me of misstating facts with him, and I asked him to delete that portion of his article. He has
not done this nor has he chosen to correct the flaws I point to.
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the thicket of social class and the American law school stimulates such a
study, he will have made an important contribution. 9 7

97.
In his reply Professor Sander responds at several points to my critique and at one point, in
his discussion of mismatch, to issues of little relevance to the issues central to this symposium. Not
only do I find aspects of Professor Sander's response insulting, but also portions of his reply ignore
relevant information, make empirical claims that I could not replicate with that I believe are better
data, and are in my view seriously flawed in their assumptions and reasoning. These are strong
claims, but unfortunately the Low Review does not have space to allow me to justify them here.
However, a detailed justification is available at http://www.denverlawreview.org/. The reader should
know that I shared most of the claims I make regarding Professor Sander's mismatch discussion
insofar as it accuses me of misstating facts with him, and I asked him to delete that portion of his
article. He has not done this nor has he chosen to correct the flaws I point to.

